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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:
Priority No. 2

v.

:

WILLIAM J. BROWNLEE

:

Defendant/Appellant.

:

Case No. 981295-CA

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conditional guilty plea to one count of possession of a
controlled substance (methamphetamine), a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 58-37-8 (1996). This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a3(2)(e)(1996).
ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Did the trial court properly deny defendant's motion to suppress on the ground that
the officer had probable cause to arrest defendant? A "bifurcated" review standard
applies to this issue. A trial court's underlying factual findings are reviewed deferentially
and reversed only for "clear error." See State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-40 (Utah 1994);
State v. Wright, 977 P.2d 505, 506 (Utah App. 1999). Its conclusions of law are reviewed
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for correctness, allowing some "measure of discretion" in the application of legal
standards to the facts. See Pena, 869 P.2d at 935-40; Wright, 977 P.2d at 506.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
U.S. Const. Amend. IV.
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (1995)
A peace officer may stop any person in a public
place when he has a reasonable suspicion to
believe he has committed or is in the act of
committing or is attempting to commit a public
offense and may demand his name, address and
an explanation of his actions.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with one count of possession of an explosive device, a
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-306 (1995); one count of
unlawful possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine) with intent to
distribute, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (1996); one
count of carrying a concealed dangerous weapon, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-504 (Supp. 1996); and one count of unlawful possession of a
controlled substance (marijuana), a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
2
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§ 58-37-8 (1996) [R. 7-10]. Defendant was bound over after a preliminary hearing [R.
88].
On August 6,1997, defendant, relying on the preliminary hearing transcript,
moved to suppress "all evidence which the arresting and investigating officers obtained
from the defendant and the vehicle occupied by the defendant and from the person of the
defendant subsequent to the arrest in this case" [R. 33]. The trial court denied
defendant's motion [R. 55].
Defendant then entered a conditional guilty plea to one count of possession of a
controlled substance (methamphetamine), reserving his right to appeal "the trial court's
decision as to the police officer's probable cause for arresting the Defendant" [R. 96-97,
137-38]. See Utah R. Cr. P. 1 l(i); State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935, 938 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal [R. 133]. This Court remanded the case
to the trial court for clarification that defendant had reserved his right to challenge the
trial court's suppression ruling under Sery. The trial court provided such clarification in
an amended order [R. 137-38].
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
A. Voluntary encounter
On April 5, 1996, Deputy Fountaine, of the Salt Lake County Sheriffs Office, was
driving near 5450 South Coliseum Court in Salt Lake County when a concerned citizen
flagged him down and advised him that a vehicle with out-of-state license plates was
3
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parked around the corner and that a male was asleep in it [R. 88:6]. The concerned
citizen identified himself to Deputy Fountaine, explained that there had been a lot of
problems in the area, including some burglaries and thefts, and asked Deputy Fountaine
to "check the car out and the person" [R. 88:6,18-19],
Deputy Fountaine proceeded to the area described and found a Corvette with
Illinois license plates parked against the curb [R. 88:6-7]. As he approached the vehicle,
Deputy Fountaine noticed a television set on the seat, "a whole bunch of [other]
property," and a man sleeping inside [R. 88:6-7]. It was about 9:36 a.m. [R. 88:7].
Several possibilities occurred to the officer: out-of-state license plates in
conjunction with all the property inside the car alerted the officer to the possibility of
burglary [R. 88:7], "I also wondered if possibly he had stopped because he was
intoxicated and then fallen asleep or something" [R. 88:7].
Deputy Fountaine knocked on the window and woke up defendant [R. 88:8,22].
Deputy Fountaine then asked defendant both for identification and to roll down the
window so that the deputy could speak with him [R. 88:8, 22]. Defendant appeared
intoxicated: he had bloodshot eyes and acted confused [R. 88:8, 21, 23]. For about five
minutes, Deputy Fountaine continued to request that defendant roll down his window and
defendant continued to act confused [R. 88:8].
B.

Detention for possible DUI supported by reasonable suspicion

Defendant then reached for his keys; at that point, Deputy Fountaine pulled his gun
4
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out of his holster and put the gun on the roof of defendant's car, aiming it into the air [R.
88:8]. Deputy Fountaine told defendant that he couldn't leave and that defendant needed
to roll down the window or unlock or open the door so that Deputy Fountaine could talk
with him [R. 88:8,24]. Deputy Fountaine explained: "I don't see that I have the
obligation to let somebody drive away in a car, that was possibly intoxicated and could
endanger other human beings"; "the jeopardy he would have imposed on-on people if I
would have let him drive away from there, led me to feel that I had to keep him there" [R.
88:21,23].
Defendant still did not roll down his window [R. 88:8]. Instead, defendant again
reached for his keys [R. 88:8]. At that point, Deputy Fountaine brought his hand back
and told defendant that he would break the window if defendant did not open the door [R.
88:8-9]. Defendant then unlocked the door and the officer was able to open it [R. 88:9].
C.

Arrest for possession of a concealed weapon

Deputy Fountaine called for backup, and Deputy Rogers arrived about one minute
later [R. 88:9]. Deputy Fountaine then asked defendant to step out of the car because "we
needed to frisk him to make sure he didn't have any weapons" [R. 88:10]. As Deputy
Fountaine began to handcuff defendant for safety and bring defendant to the deputy's car,
Deputy Rogers saw a firearm between the seat where defendant had been sitting and the
console [R. 88:10], About half of the firearm was visible once defendant exited the car
[R. 88:11,25]. Upon examination, Deputy Rogers found the gun was loaded [R. 88:11].
5
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Deputy Fountaine asked defendant for his name and for information on the gun [R.
88:11]. When defendant gave Deputy Fountaine a fictitious name, Deputy Fountaine
placed him under arrest for possession of a concealed weapon [R. 88:11-12].
D.

Search incident to arrest

Following defendant's arrest, Deputy Fountaine and another deputy began a more
thorough search of defendant [R. 88:12-13]. The deputies found three pipe bombs in one
of the fanny packs around defendant's waist and a small bag of marijuana in defendant's
left front pocket [R. 88:12-13, 32]. A subsequent search of the car revealed two small
bags of methamphetamine, numerous small plastic bags, more marijuana, and two pagers
[R. 88:29].
E.

Ruling on Motion to Suppress

At the hearing on the motion to suppress, defendant conceded that Deputy
Fountaine had reasonable suspicion to detain defendant to investigate defendant's
possible intoxication when defendant first attempted to leave the scene:
COURT:
So are you thinking the probable cause was
there to detain him to take a sobriety test or drug test there at
the scene?
DEFENSE: If indeed that's what was on the officer's mind
in terms of probable cause at that point, that's what he could
have done.

6
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[R. 148:15; Addendum B].1
Before ruling on defendant's motion, the trial court clarified that defendant was
challenging the deputy's conduct prior to defendant's actual arrest, which took place only
after discovery of defendant's gun [R. 148:11 ].
In its oral ruling on defendant's motion, the trial court found:
1.

That Deputy Fountaine had reasonable suspicion to
stop and question defendant, "the reasonable suspicion
being that the neighbor had approached the officer and
told him of this situation."2

2.

That "the car was parked in an area which was an
unusual place for a person, if he's going to be taking a
nap, to be parked."

3.

That defendant's "eyes were bloodshot."

4.

That defendant "did not roll down the window, causing
the officer to take his gun out" because "there was the
threat there."

1

An officer needs only reasonable suspicion that a person has committed or is
about to commit a crime in order to detain that person. See Pp. 9, 12-16 herein. Because
"probable cause" is a higher standard than "reasonable suspicion," defendant's
concession that Deputy Fountaine had probable cause to detain defendant is also a
concession that the deputy had reasonable suspicion to detain him. As is evident
throughout the suppression hearing transcript, the trial court often applied a higher
standard of justification to Deputy Fountaine's actions than the Fourth Amendment
requires. See, e.g., footnote 2 herein.
2

In determining that Deputy Fountaine had reasonable suspicion to justify Deputy
Fountaine's initial approach of defendant's vehicle, the trial court applied a higher
standard of justification than the Fourth Amendment requires. A police officer may
approach a parked car in a public place at any time without offending the Fourth
Amendment. See Pp. 9, 10-11 herein.
7
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5.

That Deputy Fountaine, "by this time, has seen other
things in the car which led him to somewhat of a
suspicious nature . . . a television in the back, and some
furniture.

6.

That defendant's attempt to leave the area "causes
questions to arise in the officer's mind."

[R. 148:17-18; Addendum A]. Although recognizing that no one of these factors alone
would be sufficient to uphold the detention, arrest, or search, the trial court concluded:
7.

"That an accumulation of things gives probable cause to the officer
to approach the individual to question him and to see if he is
deceased or some foul play has taken place."3

8.

That, after the officer revealed his gun, the confrontation "went to
Level 2 there."

9.

That "when he tries to start the car, the officer had the right to take
the force necessary to stop the individual from leaving the scene."

[R. 148:17-18; Addendum A].
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court properly denied defendant's motion to suppress where Deputy
Fountaine's approach of a parked car on a public street did not implicate defendant's
Fourth Amendment rights; where defendant's detention thereafter was supported by
reasonable suspicion of a possible DUI; and where his arrest was supported by probable
cause, i.e., a concealed weapon in plain view. The subsequent searches of defendant's
3

See footnote 2.
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person and the passenger compartment of his vehicle were proper as searches incident to
arrest.

ARGUMENT

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
SUPPRESS BECAUSE THE SEARCH WAS INCIDENT TO AN ARREST
SUPPORTED BY PROBABLE CAUSE
Defendant asserts that the only information that Deputy Fountaine had when he
arrested defendant was that defendant was asleep in the driver's seat "of a vehicle legally
parked which had personal property in it" and that, when defendant was awakened, he
had bloodshot eyes and was confused. Aplt. Br. at 8. Defendant argues that this
information was "not sufficient probable cause to warrant a level 3 stop as the officer did
in the instant case." Aplt. Br. at 8.
The Utah Supreme Court has identified three levels of constitutionally permissible
police/citizen encounters:
"(1) an officer may approach a citizen at anytime [sic] and
pose questions so long as the citizen is not detained against
his will; (2) an officer may seize a person if the officer has an
'articulable suspicion' that the person has committed or is
about to commit a crime; however, the 'detention must be
temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate
the purpose of the stop9; (3) an officer may arrest a suspect if
the officer has probable cause to believe an offense has been
committed or is being committed."
State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, 617-18 (Utah 1987) (per curiam) (quoting United States
v. Merritu 736 F.2d 223,230 (5th Cir. 1984)).
9
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Defendant's brief implies that Deputy Fountaine needed probable cause to justify
his actions throughout his escalating encounter with defendant, see Aplt. Br. at 7-10.
However, the deputy's encounter with defendant began as a level-one encounter, before
escalating to a level-two and then to a level-three encounter only upon the increasingly
suspicious nature of the circumstances. A different standard of justification applies to
each of these levels. See Deitman, 739 P.2d at 617-18.
Furthermore, in challenging the deputy's actions, defendant contends that "the
confusion of defendant" alone was insufficient to support probable cause and that
defendant's "blood shot eyes" alone were also insufficient, see Aplt. Br. at 8-9. However,
the Utah Supreme Court has held that the reasonableness of police action "depends on the
totality of the circumstances." Provo City v. Warden, 844 P.2d 360, 362 (Utah App.
1992) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, the trial court properly denied defendant's motion on the grounds that
Deputy Fountaine's conduct throughout his encounter with defendant was in compliance
with Deitman and the Fourth Amendment.
A.

Level-one voluntary encounter

Deputy Fountaine's encounter with defendant began as a level-one encounter.
Deputy Fountaine approached defendant's vehicle in response to a concerned citizen's
request to check it out; the vehicle was unfamiliar to the citizen, had a man sleeping in it
at 9:30 a.m., and was parked in a residential area that had recently experienced several
10
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burglaries and thefts [R. 88:6, 18-19].
Although several possibilities occurred to Deputy Fountaine as he approached
defendant's car, he did nothing at this point to detain defendant. Deputy Fountaine
merely knocked on defendant's window to ask defendant some questions and thereby
allay the fears of the concerned citizen who first approached him [R.88:8,22].
Because Deputy Fountaine had done absolutely nothing to this point to stop
defendant from leaving if he so chose, this initial encounter was a level-one encounter
that did not implicate defendant's Fourth Amendment rights. See State v. Bean, 869 P.2d
984, 986 (Utah App. 1994) ("'[A] seizure within the meaning of the fourth amendment
does not occur when a police officer merely approaches an individual on the street and
questions him, if the person is willing to listen.'" (quoting State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85,
87-88 (Utah App. 1987)); Deitman, 739 P.2d at 617 ("6[A]n officer may approach a
citizen at anytime [sic] and pose questions so long as the citizen is not detained against
his will.'"); Thompson v. State, 191 S.W.2d 450,452 (Ark. 1990) (holding officer's
approach of parked car in public place "is not a 'seizure' within the meaning of the fourth
amendment").
Defendant's reliance on State v. Struhs, 940 P.2d 1225 (Utah App. 1997), then, is
misplaced. In that case, the officer instituted a level-two stop based solely on the fact that
a vehicle was parked in an isolated area late at night. In this case, Deputy Fountaine's
initial approach to defendant's vehicle constituted only a level-one encounter.
11
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B.

Level-two detention supported by reasonable suspicion

The encounter between Deputy Fountaine and defendant rose to a level-two
encounter only when Deputy Fountaine took out his gun and told defendant not to leave
[R. 88:8,24], See Bean, 869 P.2d at 986 (holding that level-two stop "occurs when the
officer 'by means of physical force or show of authority has in some way restrained the
liberty' of a person." (quoting United States v. MendenhalU 446 U.S. 544, 552 (1980)
(citation and additional internal quotation marks omitted)). A level-two encounter must
be supported by reasonable suspicion. See Deitman, 739 P.2d at 617.
Here, Deputy Fountaine had reasonable suspicion to believe defendant was
involved in criminal activity. The deputy had approached defendant's vehicle upon the
request of a concerned citizen [R. 88:6, 19]. The car had an out-of-state license plate and
several items of personal property inside—including a television set—and was parked in
a residential neighborhood which had recently been the site of numerous thefts and
burglaries [R. 88:6,-7, 19]. The property in the car alerted the deputy to the possibility
that defendant had been involved in a burglary [R. 88:7].
Deputy Fountaine also observed that defendant was asleep in the vehicle, although
it was approximately 9:30 a.m. [R. 88:6-7]. When defendant woke up after Deputy
Fountaine knocked on the window, Deputy Fountaine saw—in the driver's seat of a
car—a confused man with bloodshot eyes [R. 88:8]. Furthermore, defendant's confusion
did not dissipate, even over a relatively significant period of time, during which defendant
12
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did not respond to Deputy Fountaine's requests [R. 88:8, 24]. This fact alerted the deputy
to the possibility that defendant "had stopped because he was intoxicated and then fallen
asleep or something" and that defendant thus "could endanger other human beings" [R.
88:7, 21]. Finally, defendant reached for his keys, from which the deputy reasonably
inferred that defendant intended to drive away [R. 88:8,23].
Under the Fourth Amendment, there is reasonable suspicion to justify a detention
if, from the facts and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, police would reasonably
suspect that criminal activity is afoot. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968); see also
Deitman, 739 P.2d at 617-18; see also State v. Rodriguez-Lopi, 954 P.2d 1290, 1292-93
(Utah App. 1998). The reasonable suspicion standard is "less demanding" than probable
cause and requires only "some minimal level of objective justification." United States v.
Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) (citations and quotation marks omitted). Whether there is
some minimal level of objective justification "depends on the totality of the
circumstances." Warden, 844 P.2d at 362 (citations omitted); see also State v. Lopez, 873
P.2d 1127, 1132 (Utah 1994); Bean, 869 P.2d at 988.
Thus, the suspicion may be based on the observation of "unusual conduct which
leads [the officer] reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity
may be afoot." Terry, 392 U.S. at 30, 88 S. Ct. at 1884; see also Rodriguez-Lopi, 954
P.2d at 1293. Although many of the facts relied upon may be "consistent with innocence,
all that is required is that the [officer's] suspicion be 'reasonable' and 'articulable/ as
13
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determined by the totality of the circumstances." United States v. Erwin, 155 F.3d 818,
823 (6th Cir. 1998) (en banc), cert denied, 119 S. Ct. 906 (1999); see also 4 Wayne R.
LaFave, Search and Seizure, A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment, §9.4(b) & n.64 (p.
147) (3rd ed. 1996) (citing cases holding that officer need not rule out possibility of
innocent behavior).
Furthermore, the attempt to flee is a relevant factor. See Illinois v. Wardlow, No.
98-1036 (U.S. January 12, 2000) (recognizing that "nervous, evasive behavior is a
pertinent factor in determining reasonable suspicion" and that "flight—wherever it
occurs—is the consummate act of evasion: it is not necessarily indicative of wrongdoing,
but it is certainly suggestive of such").
Section 41-6-44(2)(a) of the Utah Code prohibits a person from being "in actual
physical control" of a vehicle if the person is under the influence of alcohol. Utah Code
Ann. § 41-6-44(2)(a) (Supp. 1994). As this Court has noted, the purpose of this provision
is to "enable the drunken driver to be apprehended before he strikes." Richfield City v.
Walker, 790 P.2d 87, 91 (Utah App. 1990) (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted); see also State v. Clayton, 748 P.2d 401,403 (Idaho 1988) (stating "State's
interest in determining whether person in control of automobile was intoxicated, before
person had opportunity to drive in an intoxicated state, outweighed person's Fourth
Amendment interest in being left alone" (citation omitted).
Thus, a person can be "in actual physical control" of a motionless vehicle. See,
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e.g., Walker, 790 P.2d at 92. Factors relevant to determining whether a person is "in
actual physical control" of a motionless vehicle include whether the person "was
positioned in the driver's seat" and whether the person "had possession of the ignition
key, and had the apparent ability to start and move the vehicle." Id. (citing Lopez v.
Schwendiman, 720 P.2d 778, 780-81 (Utah 1986) (holding that "as long as a person is
physically able to assert dominion by starting the car and driving away, he has
substantially as much control over the vehicle as he would if he were actually driving
it")).
As defendant conceded to the trial court in the hearing on his motion to suppress,
the totality of the circumstances to this point was sufficient to raise at least an articulable
suspicion that defendant had committed or was committing a DUI [R. 148:15]. Further
detention was thus warranted. See Warden, 844 P.2d at 363 ("The Fourth Amendment's
requirement of reasonableness is analyzed by weighing the individual's right to personal
security against the public interest.").
Neither State v. Lovegren, 829 P.2d 155 (Utah App. 1992), nor State v. GodinaLuna, 826 P.2d 652 (Utah App. 1992), both cited by defendant, suggest otherwise. The
issue in Lovegren was whether continued detention was reasonable after the officer had
already checked out the defendant's license and issued defendant a citation. See
Lovegren, 829 P.2d at 156-58 (finding violation of Fourth Amendment where officer "did
nothing to confirm or deny his suspicion that Defendants were under the influence of
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drugs or alcohol" and "[w]ithout any other indication of criminal activity, the officer
simply made the decision to search the car"). The Godina-Luna court had the same
concern. See Godina-Luna, 826 P.2d at 654 (holding that officer had no reasonable
suspicion to continue to detain defendant after determining that defendant was not
intoxicated and that identification and registration of auto disclosed "nothing amiss").
In this case, far from dispelling Deputy Fountaine's suspicions, defendant's
uncooperativeness heightened them, extending the scope of the level-two detention.
C.

Scope of detention justified

Deputy Fountaine detained defendant only as long as necessary to confirm or
dispel his suspicions of criminal activity. Under the Fourth Amendment, "an officer may
seize a person if the officer has an 'articulable suspicion' that the person has committed
or is about to commit a crime" as long as the detention is "no longer than necessary to
effectuate the purpose of the stop." Deitman, 739 P.2d at 617; see also Rodriguez-Lopi,
954 P.2d at 1292. "[T]he officer must diligently pursue a means of investigation likely to
confirm or dispel the suspicions quickly." City of St. George v. Carter, 945 P.2d 165, 170
(Utah App. 1997), cert, denied, 953 P.2d 449 (Utah 1998).
In Carter, the purpose of the detention was to determine if the defendant was
intoxicated. See Carter, 945 P.2d at 170. The defendant had rolled down the window but
the officer still could not confirm or dispel his suspicion that defendant was under the
influence of alcohol, since other odors were present in the car. See id. This Court held
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that, under those circumstances, the officer's subsequent "request that defendant exit the
vehicle was an appropriate means to quickly confirm or dispel his reasonable suspicion."
Id Cf. State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127,1132 (Utah 1994) (holding that officer need not
observe actual violation to justify stop of automobile; "[shopping a vehicle may also be
justified when the officer has 'reasonable articulable suspicion that the driver is . . .
driving under the influence of alcohol'" (citation omitted)).
Here, as in Carter, one purpose of the initial detention was to determine if
defendant was intoxicated. Deputy Fountaine sought to quickly dispel or confirm his
suspicions by asking defendant to either roll down the window or open the door to the
truck [R. 88: 8, 24]. Defendant did not roll down his window [R. 88:8]. Thus, Deputy
Fountaine could not yet confirm or dispel his reasonable suspicion that defendant was
under the influence of alcohol. Deputy Fountaine then asked defendant to exit
defendant's vehicle. As in Carter, that request "was an appropriate means to quickly
confirm or dispel his reasonable suspicion" and was therefore "permissible." Id4

defendant cites to State v. James, 977 P.2d 489 (Utah App.), cert, granted, 984
P.2d 1023 (Utah 1999), to support his claim that the search in this case was illegal.
However, the precedential value of James is uncertain. The Utah Supreme Court has
granted the State's petition for certiorari in that case. See State v. James, 984 P.2d 1023
(Utah 1999). Furthermore, James is distinguishable on the facts. In James, this Court
found that the officer "may or may not have knocked on the window, but, without
necessarily waiting for a response, opened the door," James, 977 P.2d at 490; here,
Deputy Fountaine repeatedly gave defendant a choice of either rolling down the window
or opening the door [R. 88:8-9, 22, 24]. Defendant's unlocking his door rather than
opening his window indicated his preference that contact be made through an open door
[R. 88:9].
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D.

Level-three arrest supported by probable cause

The encounter rose to a level-three encounter when Deputy Fountaine arrested
defendant. It was only the arrest—which occurred after defendant's gun was seen in
plain sight, and after defendant provided Deputy Fountaine with a fictitious name [R.
88:12,26; 148:11 ]—that had to be supported by probable cause.
As discussed above, Deputy Fountaine lawfully detained defendant to determine at
least whether defendant was intoxicated. Completion of that investigation required, at the
least, that defendant lower his car window, or, in the alternative, exit his car. Defendant,
by unlocking his door [R. 88:9], apparently chose the latter, at which point Deputy
Fountaine called for backup [R. 88:9]. Deputy Rogers arrived within about one minute
[R. 88:9]. Deputy Fountaine then asked defendant to step out of the car "to frisk him to
make sure he didn't have any weapons" [R. 88:10]. See State v. Schlosser, 774 P.2d
1132, 1135 (Utah 1989) (holding that "officer, for his own protection, may . . . order a
driver out of a vehicle."). Almost immediately, Deputy Rogers identified a loaded
firearm in plain view next to where defendant had been sitting [88:10-11, 25].
"A seizure is valid under the plain view doctrine if (1) the officer is lawfully
present, (2) the item is in plain view, and (3) the item is clearly incriminating." State v.
Shepard, 955 P.2d 352, 357 (Utah App. 1998). Deputy Fountaine had reasonable
suspicion to detain defendant and order defendant out of his car to determine whether he
was about to drive away while intoxicated. The officers were thus lawfully present when
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they saw defendant's gun in plain view. See, e.g., Schlosser, 774 P.2d at 1135; Carter,
945 P.2d at 170. Furthermore, the gun was clearly incriminating, especially in light of the
television and other items of personal property in defendant's car suggesting a possible
burglary and defendant's confused behavior. See, e.g., United States v. Hatten, 68 F.3d
257,261 (8th Cir. 1995) ("Hidden guns, even badly hidden guns, are by their nature
incriminating.") (and cases cited therein). Seizure of the gun was therefore justified
under the plain view doctrine. Cf. Shepard, 955 P.2d at 357 (upholding seizure of
corncob pipe in passenger side door which came into plain view when passenger exited
automobile after request by officer to do so); State v. O 'Brien, 959 P.2d 647, 649-50
(Utah App. 1998).
Thus, in addition to defendant's suspicious behavior, his persistent state of
confusion, and the items of personal property in the car in a neighborhood recently
plagued with burglaries, defendant was carrying a concealed and loaded weapon [R. 88:611]. Defendant then gave the deputies a false name [R. 88:11-12].
In State v. Wright, 977 P.2d 505 (Utah App. 1999), this Court explained:
Probable cause is present when "'"the facts and circumstances
within [the officers'] knowledge and of which they ha[ve]
reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in
themselves to warrant a [person] of reasonable caution in the
belief that" an offense has been or is being committed.'"
Id. at 507 (quoting State v. Spurgeon, 904 P.2d 220, 225 (Utah App. 1995) (other
citations omitted)). As with reasonable suspicion, whether there is probable cause
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depends on the totality of the circumstances. See State v. Anderson, 910 P.2d 1229, 1233
(Utah 1996); Spurgeon, 904 P.2d at 227. In this case, the totality of the circumstances
indicate that probable cause existed to arrest defendant [R. 88:11-12,26].5
E.

Search incident to arrest

During a search of defendant's person subsequent to his arrest, the deputies found
three pipe bombs in a fanny pack around defendant's waist and a bag of marijuana in his
front pocket [R. 88:13]. A search of the passenger compartment of his car revealed
methamphetamine, marijuana, two pagers, and numerous small plastic bags [R. 88:29].
"According to the rule allowing a search incident to an arrest, an arresting officer
may, without a warrant, lawfully search the area surrounding the person he or she is
arresting if: (1) the arrest is lawful, (2) the search is of the area within the arrestee's
immediate control; and (3) the search is conducted contemporaneously to the arrest."
State v. Giron, 943 P.2d 1114, 1117-18 (Utah App. 1997).
As established in Subsection D above, the arrest in this case was lawful. See Pp.
18-20 herein. Furthermore, because a search incident to arrest may include the search

5

Defendant suggests that failure to arrest defendant for the crime originally
suspected of forecloses the ability to arrest him for any other crime. See Aplt. Br. at 9.
However, in light of this more immediately serious criminality, it is neither unusual nor
improper that the deputy did not further investigate defendant's suspected intoxication.
See, e.g., State v. Maycock, 947 P.2d 695 (Utah App. 1997); State v. Ottesen, 920 P.2d
183 (Utah App. 1995); State v. Spurgeon, 904 P.2d 220 (Utah App. 1996) (all involving
stops pursuant to observed traffic violation where no traffic citation was ultimately issued
due to discovery of more serious offenses).
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both of the person actually arrested and of the passenger compartment of the automobile
in which the person was an occupant, the search in this case was a search of the area
within defendant's immediate control. See Giron, 943 at 1118 (holding search of
passenger compartment is proper "even when . . . the arrested occupant of the car has
already been handcuffed and removed from the car" (quoting New York v. Belton, 453
U.S. 454,460,101 S. Ct. 2860,2864 (1981))); Spurgeon, 904 P.2d at 228. Finally, the
search occurred contemporaneously with defendant's arrest [R. 88:12-14].
Although defendant argues that the evidence taken from his person and his car is
inadmissible because the searches were illegal, both searches were valid as searches
incident to defendant's arrest.
CONCLUSION
Based on the above, the State requests that the Court affirm the trial court's
denial of defendant's motion to suppress below.
M
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man and question him, because he suspected him to be
under the influence of alcohol or drugs, he would have
given him a field sobriety test and asked him to take
a blood or urine test.
THE COURT:

Does he have probable cause to

unholster his gun and detain him when he tried to
start the car?
MR. MCCOY:
don't think he did.
committed.

Well, to tell you the truth, I
Because no crime had been

There's no evidence that any crime had

been committed.

There isn't anything there.

I mean

this is a casual encounter that isn't -- the guy
doesn't want to talk to him.
THE COURT:

That's all I have.

You're standing, Mr. Lemcke.

I allow you, then I'd have to allow Mr. McCoy.

If

I

would indicate to you, counsel, that I have read your
memoranda, and I have read the cases submitted by Mr.
McCoy, and the court was somewhat familiar with some
of these cases.

And of course I've dealt with

probable-cause type cases many times.
And it's always a close question -- well,
not always, but I'd say an awful lot of cases that are
close.

And of course in the Struts

case, it does give

the three situations as far as the levels of stopping.
And the court would find that an officer
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does have the right, under reasonable suspicion, to
stop and question an individual, the reasonable
suspicion being that the neighbor had approached the
officer and told him of this situation.
Now, I guess the neighbor said, "The man is
sleeping in the car,"

I guess the neighbor didn't

know if he was sleeping or if he was dead or what the
situation was.
But the car was parked in an area which was
an unusual place for a person, if he's going to be
taking a nap, to be parked.

I'm not saying that if a

person wants to take a nap in a residential area that
he doesn't have a right to, but I'm saying that an
accumulation of things gives probable cause to the
officer to approach the individual to question him and
to see if he is deceased or some foul play has taken
place.
When he approached him, the person awakened.
His eyes were bloodshot.
were sufficient.

I don't think bloodshot eyes

I know it's not, in and of itself,

to be sufficient.
But the person did not roll down the window,
causing the officer to take his gun out.

He didn't

point the gun at him at that point, but I think there
was the threat there, the evidence of fear on the part
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of the officer as he took his gun out and held it on
the roof of the car.
I'm sure the defendant saw the gun, and I'm
sure that was the intent of the officer; the intent
being to want him to roll down the window and not
start the car and not leave.
I think it went to Level 2 there, as I think
both counsel argued.

I think that when he tries to

start the car, the officer had the right to take the
force necessary to stop the individual from leaving
the scene.

He also, by that time, has seen other

things in the car which led him to somewhat of a
suspicious nature; but that itself would not be
sufficient, if he had just seen a television in the
back, and some furniture.

Maybe he's moving.

But he tries to leave the area, in which
case it causes questions to arise in the officer's
mind.

The court finds -- first of all, let me

indicate that there are some close situations here,
but I do find that the officer had probable cause to
question the individual.

He had probable cause to

detain the individual.
Upon the individual trying to leave, he had
probable cause to then take him into custody, to
search the car, and to arrest him, with the evidence
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that he found.
The court would find in favor of the State,
denying the defendant's motion to suppress the
evidence, and allow the evidence to be used at the
time of trial.

MR. MCCOY:

No.

THE COURT:

Counsel, we have a trial date

coming up.

Thank you.

Keep me informed.

and situations.
place.

Any questions?

I do have other matters

Keep me informed as to what's taking

Thank you, counsel.
MR. LEMCKE:

Thank you, your Honor.

(Whereupon, the instant proceedings came to
a close.)

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

1!

Addendum B

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

1
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

2
3

IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY,

STATforpg'^AllCOUXT
Third Judicial District

4

DEC 0 61999

5 THE STATE ur

UTAH,
By

Plaintiff,

6
7

9 7 1 9 0 07 JT*™

Transcript of:

vs .

8 WILLIAM

Case No.

^.S^L.pif

HEARING ON MOTION
TO SUPPRESS

BROWNLEE,

Defendant,

9
10
11

BEFORE THE HONORABLE HOMER F. WILKINSON
12
13
14

SCOTT M. MATHESON COURTHOUSE
450 SOUTH STATE STREET
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84114-1860

15
16

ORIGINAL

17
18
19

REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

20

AUGUST 13, 1997

21
22
23

REPORTED BY
24

ED MIDGLEY, RPR, RMR
238-7533

FILED

25
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School,
BYU.
Clerk
oUi»«
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

7$

test or urine test.

He didn't do it.

I ' in say iiig Lhat his lac k <,» t
his real intent
i e1evan t „

IHI e

that morning.
L have

d idn

That's what

I;: 11 e

man for a DUI or drug-related

i n ten I

to

then

take

a blood

TH E! C0LIRT :

So

test.
a re

there at the

MR. MCCOY:

He

that's what he could have

MR
had

-- that

just wanted

MCCOY:

probable

test

cause at

that

done.

for that

purpose,

to stop and question him at the

and then do what
f

m saying

that was in his mind
to talk to him,

this business of bloodshot
any thing

the

But if that was not on his mind,

does he have the right
that he did,

that.

that's what was on the

if he had no intention of stopping

point

do

asked

scene?

If indeed

THE C0UR1 :

didn't

thI s

or he

_ _ take a sobriety

officer's mi nd in terms of probable
point,

s I; o p p i n g

t, e s L s a n d

y'o u t. h I n k i n g

cause was there to detain him
drug test

o£

is

driving offense,

w o u 1 d h a v e p in I h 1 in t h r. o u g 11 a o b i i ety
him

do i ng t h.a t s hows

and

followed?

that I don't

think he

that morning.
I don't

think

eyes or nervousness

He
that
has

t o d o w 11 h t: h is case as far as a practical

matter.
And that morning,

the officer

he truly thought he had probable

cause

is truly
wO stop

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-- If

this

15

